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Corporate successor liability for punitive damages is a legal issue
that will arise more frequently because both product longevity and
global corporate transformations are rapidly growing.' Merger and
acquisition activity reached previously unheard of levels in the
1980S2 and, after a brief slowdown in the early 1990s, has grown to
unprecedented levels. Indeed, as we close the decade, the deals
announced are staggering in both frequency and dimension. 3 The
entities that result from various business combinations, known as
"successors,"4  face potential liability for tortious conduct
committed by their acquired corporations.
A tremendous amount of litigation has centered separately on
successor liability and on punitive damages, and the U.S. Supreme
Court has recently ruled on constitutional challenges to such
damages.5 However, relatively few courts have decided whether a
successor corporation should be liable for punitive damages.6 This
* The author, a former law clerk to the Honorable Charles H. Tenney, U.S.D.J., S.D.N.Y.,
is an attorney practicing litigation in New York City. He received his J.D. from Cardozo
School of Law in 1987. He wishes to thank his wife, Julie, for providing the time opportunity
that enabled him to work on this article.
1. Barry Levenstan & Daniel Lynch, Punitive Damages Awards Against Successor
Corporations: Deterrent of Malicious Torts or Legitimate Acquisitions?, 26 ToRT & INs. LJ.
27, 28 (1990).
2. Approximately 1.3 trillion dollars was expended during the 1980s on mergers and
acquisitions. See Strategic Deals Can Be Good Building Blocks, Bus. Wy-, Jan. 15, 1990, at 94.
3. For example, on November 30, 1998, Exxon agreed to buy Mobil for 75.3 billion
dollars. See Christopher Cooper & Steve Liesman, Historic Deal, Precipitated by Plunging
Oil Prices, Signals Shift in Industry, WALL ST. J., December 2, 1998, at A3.
4. A successor may arise from a variety of transactions, the structure of which may
control the successor's liabilities for a predecessor's products. See infra notes 7-22.
5. See, e.g., BMW of North America, Inc., v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1604 (1996) (due
process challenge); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 418 (1994) (procedural due
process); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446 (1993) (procedural
and substantive due process); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 7 (1990)
(procedural due process); Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc, 492 U.S. 257,
276-77 (1989) (due process and excessive fines).
6. The sole exception is asbestos litigation, where the issue has arisen relatively
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article will discuss successor liability for punitive damages and
posits that rote application of the corporate law principle that a
successor is liable for all of its predecessor's liabilities may be,
depending on the circumstances, an improper justification for
imposing punitive damages upon a successor, in violation of the
fundamental underpinnings of punitive damages.
I. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
This portion of the article explains the traditional rules of
successor liabilities and the exceptions to those rules.
A. Traditional Rules
An individual or entity may acquire a corporation through the
following means: (1) merger; (2) share exchange; (3) stock
purchase; or (4) asset purchase.7 In a statutory merger, the assets
of the corporation are exchanged for stock in the successor.8 The
buyer succeeds to all debts and liabilities of the purchased entity.9
Acquisition by merger results in termination of the predecessor and
the "new" corporation, or successor, is traditionally liable for the
debts and liabilities of the previous entity.10 Many courts have
upheld punitive damages levied against a successor by merger
because the tortfeasor, as predecessor, has not been eliminated
from participation in the successor but, rather, the merger "merely
directs the blood of the old corporation into the veins of the
new."1
In a share exchange, upon the required vote of the acquired
corporation, its shareholders tender their shares for cash, stock or
other consideration of the acquiring corporation.12 The sale of its
frequently.
7. See 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 7041-7046 (penn. ed., rev. vol. 1990). In addition, a selling entity can liquidate
without providing for unknown claims and the shareholders are not liable except to the
extent of their liquidation distribution. See RONALD J. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE AcQUISITIONS 1095-1141 (1986). Moreover, states typically have statutes that
provide a fixed time of only two to three years for creditors to make any claims. See, e.g.,
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (1991); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 105 (1979).
8. See 15 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 7041.
9. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 906 (McKinney 1986); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 76
(1979).
10. See 15 FLETCHER CYc. CORP. § 7041.
11. See Moe v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 289 (1971).
12. See 15 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 7045 and cases cited therein.
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shares does not eliminate the acquired corporation. 13 Further, in
contrast to mergers and consolidations, the acquired corporation
remains liable for its prior liabilities. 14 If the acquired corporation is
subsequently merged or dissolved into the acquiring corporation,
the latter will become liable for the acquired corporation's
liabilities.
15
In a stock purchase, a corporation acquires the target
corporation's stock as opposed to its assets.16 As a result, the target
corporation becomes a wholly-owned subsidiary of the buyer. 7 The
purchaser is protected from liability for the tortious acts of the
target corporation in as much as creditors cannot reach the parent
purchaser unless there are grounds to pierce the corporate veil.'8
Of course if there are an excessive number of claims arising from
the tortious acts of the acquired corporation, the value of the
parent's stock holdings may suffer dramatically.
With respect to an asset purchase, the traditional corporate rule
is that when one entity sells its assets to a purchaser, the buyer
does not assume the liabilities of the acquired company.19 The
traditional rule promotes the mobility of capital, assists in
allocation of taxes, and protects creditors and dissenting
shareholders. 20 It has also been said that adhering to the traditional
rule fosters "a climate of relative certainty and reasonable
predictability."21 Of course, courts will not sanction abuse and may
find that "the new organization is simply the older one in guise. " 22
B. The Exceptions to the Non-Liability Rule for the Buyer
While a corporation purchasing the assets of another entity
generally will not succeed to the acquired corporation's liabilities,23
there are four exceptions to this rule: (1) when the buyer expressly
or impliedly agreed to assume any or all debts; (2) when the
transaction constitutes a de facto merger;, (3) when the successor is
a mere continuation of the acquired; and (4) when the transaction
13. See 15 id. § 7045.
14. See 15 id.
15. See 15 id.
16. See 15 id. § 7046.
17. See 15 FizrcHR Cyc. CORP. § 7046.
18. See 15 id.
19. See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F2d 75 (3d Cir 1986).
20. See Polius, 802 F.2d at 78.
21. Id. at 83.
22. See id. at 78.
23. See 15 FLETCHER CYc. CORP. § 7122.
1999
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is a conveyance made in an attempt to fraudulently evade liability.24
Courts have also expanded these above four exceptions to the
traditional rule of non-liability for the buyer in an asset purchase to
include three additional exceptions known as (1) "continuation of
enterprise,"25 (2) "product line,"26 and (3) duty to warn.
27
1. Assumption of Liabilities
The first exception occurs in situations where the buyer
expressly or impliedly agreed to assume some or all of the debts
and liabilities of the seller.28 Such an agreement may, depending on
the intent of the parties, confer liability on the purchaser
successor.29 If the buyer's assumption is broad in nature, liability
will transfer to the buyer. If the assumption clause is narrow and
contains limits or disclaimers, liability may not vest with the
successor.30 Furthermore, despite the fact that a general assumption
clause does not expressly state that the buyer will assume liability,
the courts may find that such a clause nevertheless serves to
impose liability on the purchaser.3' In Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc.,
32
the court held that an asset-sale agreement in which the purchaser
explicitly assumed and agreed "to pay, perform and discharge all
debts, obligations, contracts and liabilities" of the seller included
unforeseen product liability claims.3 The court rejected the
purchaser's claim that the purchase terms were ambiguous because
they did not reference product liability claims.34
In Baker v. National State Bank, the New Jersey Superior Court
simply looked at the successor as a product of a statutory merger,
which saddled the successor with "all [of] the obligations and
24. See 15 id.
25. See Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
26. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 121-22.
28. In certain situations, courts have held that statutes that require successor
corporations to be liable for all liabilities and obligations of corporations that have merged
or consolidated also contemplate that a successor corporation will be liable for punitive
damages. See Schmidt v. Financial Resources Corp., 680 P.2d 845 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
29. See Bouton v. Litton Indus., Inc., 423 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1970). See also Douglas v.
Bank of New England/Old Colony, 566 A.2d 939 (R.I. 1989).
30. See Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (finding no
express or implied transfer of product liability).
31. See Hanlon v. Johns-Manville Corp., 599 F Supp. 376, 378 (N.D. Iowa 1984).
32. 875 F2d 153 (7th Cir. 1989).




liabilities" of the predecessor. 5 In affirming that court's decision,
the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the successor was
indeed liable for punitive damages arising from the acts of its
predecessor.36
Upon completion of a statutory merger, the successor assumes
the liabilities of the predecessor. As stated in the Delaware General
Corporation Law, "[w]hen any merger or consolidation shall
become effective . . all debts, liabilities and duties of the
respective constituent corporations shall thence forth attach to said
surviving or resulting corporation, and may be enforced against it
to the same extent . . . -37 Other states are in accord with the
Delaware statute on mergers.38 Courts who do not analyze a
transaction beyond its form will likely impose punitive damages on
a successor notwithstanding the lack of any wrongful conduct on
behalf of the successor corporation.
39
2. De Facto Merger
The next exception to the traditional rule of non liability for
purchaser successors is the de facto merger doctrine. Under this
exception, if the transaction constitutes a merger, liability of the
predecessor will be conferred upon the successor irrespective of
the characterization of the transaction.40 The purpose of the
exception in imposing liability upon the successor is to prevent the
predecessor from evading liability through mere changes in
corporate form.41 Factors such as (1) identical shareholders,
management, and personnel in the predecessor and the successor
corporations, (2) the dissolution of the predecessor, and (3) the
assumption of business liabilities by the successor are factors
which tend to suggest a de facto merger.42 Moreover, an exchange
of the predecessor's assets for the successor's stock has been
35. 711 A_2d 917, 929 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1998).
36. Baker v. National State Bank, 736 A.2d 462 (Nov. 1999). The court did not go
beyond the form of the transaction. Id. But see Brotherton v. Celotex Corp., 493 A.2d 1337,
1341 (N.J. 1985), infra notes 171-76 and accompanying text (analyzing the transaction
beyond its mere form).
37. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259 (1991). "
38. See, e.g., Parra v. Production Machine Co., 611 F Supp. 221, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("A
merger contemplates the absorption of one corporation by another with the latter retaining
the absorbed corporation's name and corporate identity.").
39. See, e.g., Baker, 736 A.2d at 465.
40. See 15 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 7045.10.
41. See 15 id.
42. See Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F Supp. 797, 799 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
1999
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found, under certain circumstances, to amount to a merger
invoking the exception.4- De facto mergers will result in liability
being imposed upon the successor for punitive damages based on
the tortious conduct of the predecessor."
This exception was recognized by the district court in Shannon
v. Langston Co., a diversity case decided under New Jersey law.45
In Shannon, an asset purchase bore resemblance to a statutory
merger because payment for the purchase consisted only of the
successor's stock and the acquired corporation dissolved shortly
after the transaction.46 The court evaluated four factors in
determining whether the transaction amounted to a de facto
merger.4 First, the court observed the continuity of stockholder
interest from the predecessor to the successor corporations."
Second, the court noted that the acquired entity liquidated and
dissolved as soon as "legally and practically as possible."49 Third,
the court looked for a link between the purchaser and the
acquired, such as continuity of management, personnel and
business operations.5° Fourth, the court evaluated the extent to
which the purchaser assumed the liabilities necessary for the
operation of the business. 5' The Shannon court's holding
established that a buyer who receives the benefits of the acquired
must also assume the costs attendant to the acquired.52
While a de facto merger typically involves a transfer of stock, at
least one court, in Diaz v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., has applied the
de facto merger exception in a situation where no stock was
transferred. In Diaz, while no shares of stock were exchanged, the
court ruled the transaction to be a de facto merger based upon the
dissolution of the predecessor, the assumption of liabilities by the
successor, and continuity of personnel, management and physical
plant between the predecessor and the successor.5 It should be
43. See Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974).
44. See Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
45. Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 798-99.
46. Id. at 799.
47. Id. at 801 (citing McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1970)).
48. Id. at 799.
49. Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 800.
50. Id. at 797.
51. Id. at 800.
52. Id. at 802.
53. 707 F. Supp. 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
54. Diaz, 707 F. Supp. at 101-02.
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noted, however, that typically when a court finds a successor in a
context not involving the transfer of stock, the court applies the
continuity of enterprise exception rather than the de facto merger
exception.55
3. Mere Continuation
Courts recognize another exception to the rule of non-liability in
instances where the buyer is merely a continuation of the seller.
This exception, articulated in Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.,56 focuses on
whether there is a continuity of ownership or corporate structure
between the buyer and seller. One court has described the
appropriate test to determine whether this exception is applicable
by stating that "[t]he test is not the continuation of the business
operation, but rather the continuation of the corporate entity."
57
Under the mere continuation exception, the "identity of the
officers, directors and stockholders" remain the same and only one
corporate entity survives.5 In other words, "[flor liability to attach,
the purchasing corporation must represent merely a 'new hat' for
the seller." 51 In Cyr, a group of key personnel bought the
proprietorship from the sole owner who had died and continued
the same business in the same name.60 The court found the
successor merely donned a "new hat" and, thus, held the successor
liable.6
1
A court's application of either the de facto merger doctrine or
the mere continuation exception yields nearly identical results;
however, the reasoning behind these exceptions is radically
different. In applying the de facto merger doctrine, the Shannon
court based its decision on principles of corporate law to find
successor liability.62 In contrast, Cyr relied upon reference to the
traditional four tort law justifications - to wit - (1) the
manufacturer is better able to bear the costs than the consumer;
(2) the manufacturer placed the product in commerce; (3) the
55. See National Gypsum Co. v. Continental Brands Corp., 895 F Supp. 328, 341 n.17
(D. Mass. 1995) (stating "that Diaz relies entirely on the 'continuity of enterprise' type of
reasoning" and not the de facto merger doctrine).
56. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
57. Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, 698 F Supp. 535, 542 (D. Del. 1988).
58. Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977).
59. McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 106 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970), aff'd,
288 A.2d 585 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
60. Cyr, 501 F2d. at 1151.
61. Id.
62. Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
1999
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manufacturer impliedly warranted the product's safety by placing
the same in commerce; and (4) the manufacturer is best suited to
improving the product's quality.65
4. Fraudulent Conveyance
The fourth and fmal traditional exception to the non-liability rule
of buyers is where a transaction is entered into to evade liability.
Corporations cannot avoid liability through a fraudulent
conveyance, such that a successor to a fraudulent conveyance will
be liable in tort for the conduct of its predecessor.4 This exception
is consistent with the general rule against fraudulent conveyances
and will be applied when the transfer is intended to avoid future
liability65 or prior judgments entered against a predecessor.6
Inadequate consideration will likewise come within the ambit of
this exception.
67
5. Continuation of Enterprise
In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.,68 the court expanded
both the de facto merger and the mere continuation exception, by
eliminating the continuity of ownership requirement.9 In Turner, a
power press manufactured by a corporation known as "Old
Sheridan" injured the plaintiff.70 Prior to the injury but after the
sale of the press, "Harris" bought Old Sheridan for cash and
established "New Sheridan" as a subsidiary of Harris, into which
went Old Sheridan.71 Shortly following the sale, Old Sheridan was
dissolved and New Sheridan continued as a wholly owned
subsidiary of Harris.72 Several years after this transaction, New
63. Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1154.
64. See Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 70 So. 2d 789 (La. 1916). But
see Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (holding that a disclaimer of
tort liability in an asset purchase does not constitute a fraudulent conveyance where no
other remedy is available to the plaintiff).
65. See Raytech Corp. v. White, 54 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 1995).
66. See Schmoll v. Acands, Inc., 703 F Supp. 868 (D. Or. 1988), affd, 977 F.2d 499 (9th
Cir. 1992). See also Locafrance United States Corp. v. Interstate Distribution Servs., Inc., 451
N.E.2d 1222 (Ohio 1983).
67. See Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., No. CV 920339263, 1996 WL 469716 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1996).
68. 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
69. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 883.
70. Id. at 875.
71. Id. at 875-76.
72. Id. at 876.
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Sheridan merged into and became a division of Harris.73 The trial
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment,
holding that because neither Harris nor New Sheridan had
manufactured the press, neither was liable.74 The Supreme Court of
Michigan reversed, citing to Shannon and Cyr.75 Although Turner
did not involve a transfer of stock as Shannon did,76 the court
found that the other necessary factors were present. 77 The court
observed that the number of acquired shareholders' shares in the
successor may be so minimal that commonality is small, but
present nevertheless.7 8 In addition, it noted that in the absence of
the original manufacturer, a plaintiff may be left without a
remedy.79
Turner relied upon Cyr as its justification for imposing liability,8°
finding the successor to be the best cost-bearer and the entity
capable of improving the product.8' Accordingly, despite the
absence of the other two factors, i.e. the successor did not place
the product into commerce nor make any representations with
respect to the safety of the product, the Turner court found the
successor liable.82 The court's decision expanded the traditional
corporate rule rather than employing a new theory based upon tort
principles. The court remarked "[c]ontinuity is the purpose,
continuity is the watchword, continuity is the fact."s3
The continuity of enterprise exception has been embraced in
Alabama, s4 and impliedly adopted in Michigan,8 New Jersey,
8 6
Ohio87  and Pennsylvania.88 One federal court interpreting
Mississippi law has also recognized the continuity of enterprise
73. Id.
74. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 876.
75. Id. at 881, 884.
76. Id. at 876.
77. Id. at 883-84.
78. Id. at 880.
79. Turner, 244 N.W2d at 878.
80. Id. at 881.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 884.
83. Id. at 882.
84. See Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 781 (Ala. 1979).
85. See Foster v. Cone-Blanchard Mach. Co., 560 N.W.2d 664 (Mich. Ct App. 1997) rev'd
597 N.W.2d 506 (Mich. 1999) (finding that the availability of other recourse against the
predecessor rendered the continuity of enterprise exception inapplicable).
86. See Woodrick v. Jack J. Burke Real Estate, 703 A.2d 306 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div.
1997).
87. See McGaw v. South Bend Lathe, Inc., 598 N.E.2d 18 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
88. See Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106 (Pa. Super. 1981).
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exception.89 However, the number of states rejecting the exception
dwarfs the number adopting the same.90
6. Product Line Exception
In Ray v. Alad,91 the Supreme Court of California discarded
corporate law principles and embraced a strict liability approach to
corporate successor liability.92 Pursuant to Akad, irrespective of the
transaction's terms, a successor is liable if it continues the
predecessor's product line.93 In Alad, the successor purchased the
assets of the target corporation for cash.94 Included among the
assets were inventory, the plant, equipment, designs, and the
goodwill of the predecessor.95 The successor continued to sell and
market the identical product under the same name and with the
same personnel as the predecessor.96 Initially, the court determined
that under these facts, neither the de facto merger exception nor
the mere continuation exception was applicable. 97 Although the
court noted that a finding of non-liability as to the successor would
promote capital availability, the court held that the importance of
providing a remedy for the injured party outweighed the benefit of
transferability of capital.
98
Alad found three justifications for imposing liability based on the
product line exception. First, the elimination of the predecessor
89. See Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F2d 168 (5th Cir. 1985).
90. See Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying
Kentucky law); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying Indiana and Ohio
law); Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F Supp. 619 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (applying Arkansas law);
Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 535 (D. Del. 1988); Johnston v. Amsted Indus.,
Inc., 830 P.2d 1141 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Pancratz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W2d 198 (Iowa
1996); Green v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 460 N.E.2d 895 (IIl. App. Ct. 1984); Nissen Corp.
v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564 (Md. 1991); Niccum v. Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W2d 96 (Minn. 1989);
Chemical Design, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Jones
v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982); Schumacher v. Richards Shear
Co., Inc., 451 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. 1983); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347
N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1984); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986);
Harris v. TI., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605 (Va. 1992); and Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820
(Wis. 1985).
91. 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
92. Alad, 560 P.2d at 11.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 5.
95. Id. However, the transaction excluded the predecessor's cash, insurance,
receivables and prepaid expenses. Id.
96. Id.
97. Alad, 560 P.2d at 5.
98. Id.
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effectively removed the plaintiffs remedy against said predecessor 99
because it would be impractical to recover damages from former
shareholders and the predecessor's insurance would not cover
post-transaction injuries. 1°0 Second, the successor was capable of
obtaining insurance to cover itself in regard to future tort claims.
101
Third, the successor as recipient of the predecessor's goodwill must
also assume any "bad will" of the predecessor.' °2
Not many jurisdictions have embraced the product line
exception. To date, aside from California, only New Jersey,' °3 New
Mexico, 4 Pennsylvania,0 5 and Washington' 6 have done so. 10 7 New
York courts are split on the issue.0 8 However, jurisdictions that
have adopted A/ad have interpreted the exception broadly. For
example, in Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp.,1°9 the New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled that the product line exception encompasses
not only the current successor but, rather, all viable intermediate
successors. °10 The Nieves court ruled that Atad "was concerned not
as much with the availability of one particular viable successor as
it was with the unavailability of the original manufacturer by
reason of its divestiture of assets and dissolution.""'
Similarly, in Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc.," 2 the court held a
99. Id. at 9.
100. Id. at 10.
101. Id.
102. Alad, 560 P.2d at 10.
103. See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981).
104. See Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243 (N.M. 1997).
105. Hill v. Trailmobile, 603 A-2d 602, 606 (Pa. Super. 1992) ("[Pennsylvania is] one of
the few states to adopt the product-line exception to successor liability.")
106. Hall v. Armstrong, 692 P.2d 787, 791 (Wash. 1984).
107. In addition, trial courts in Connecticut have applied the product line exception.
See Pastorrek App. Div. v. Lyn-Lad Truck Racks, Inc., No. CV 9605624268, 1999 WL 608674
(Conn. Super. 1999).
108. See Hart v. Bruno Machinery Corp., 679 N.Y.S.2d 740 (3rd Dep't. App. Div. 1998)
(adopting the product line theory). But see City of New York v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 688
N.Y.S.2d 23 (1st Dep't. App. Div. 1999) ("[W]e would decline to adopt the 'product line'
approach as a radical change from existing law ... ."). In Rothstein v. Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Co., No. 98-04929, 1999 WL 968186 (2d Dep't. App. Div. 1999), the court did not
reach the issue but noted the split in authority. New York's highest court has not definitively
ruled on the issue. See Schumacher v. Richard Shear Co., 451 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. 1983)
(adopting neither the product line nor the continuity of enterprise exception, but noting both
were inapplicable to facts of the case). See also Howard v. Clifton Hydraulic Press Co., 830
E Supp. 708 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying New York law and declining to adopt either the
product line or continuity of enterprise exception).
109. 431 A.2d 826 (N.J. 1981).
110. Nieves, 431 A.2d at 831.
111. Id.
112. 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
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successor liable notwithstanding the fact that the successor never
manufactured the product but merely continued the predecessor's
business."3 The Rawlings court found that the successor enjoyed
the goodwill of the predecessor as to the remaining products of the
business.114
Numerous jurisdictions have considered and rejected the product
line approach. These jurisdictions question the policy objectives
listed in A/ad and seek to retain the traditional rule of
non-liability."
5
While the product line exception has not been widely adopted in
the years following its first articulation, New Jersey stands out as
having expanded this exception and holds successors liable even
when they did not continue to manufacture the product." 6 New
Jersey has also extended liability under the product line exception
to intermediate successors"' as well purchasers in bankruptcy
proceedings. 18
In California, courts have limited Rawlings and have applied the
product line exception only in the context of strict liability.119
Another California court limited Rawlings to situations in which
the successor could allocate the risk, allocate the financial burden
to the actual responsible party, and spread out the cost of injury.120
113. Rawlings, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22.
114. Id. at 124-25.
115. See Johnson v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Bernard v.
Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982); Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 328 S.E.2d 726
(Ga. 1985); Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 388 N.E.2d 778 (I. App. Ct. 1979); DeLapp v.
Xtraman, Inc., 417 N.W.2d 219 (Iowa 1987); Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1984); Guzman v. MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E.2d 929 (Mass. 1991); Pelc v. Bendix Mach.
Tool Corp.,, 314 N.W. 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Niccum v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 438 N.W2d 96
(Minn. 1989); Young v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Jones v.
Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982); Simoneau v. South Bend Lathe,
Inc., 543 A.2d 407 (N.H. 1988); Downtown, Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118
(N.D. 1984); Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1987); Goucher v.
Parmac, Inc., 694 P.2d 953 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach. Inc., 387
N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986); Griggs v. Capital Mach. Work, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App.
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126 (Vt. 1984); Harris v. T.I.
Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605 (Va. 1992); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820 (Wis. 1985).
116. See Pacius v. Thermtroll Corp., 611 A.2d 153 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992).
117. See Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 431 A.2d 826 (N.J. 1981). See also Trimper v.
Harris Corp., 441 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (holding an intermediate successor may be
liable under the continuity of enterprise exception).
118. See Wilkerson v. C.O. Porter Mach. Co., 567 A.2d 598 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1989) (allowing plaintiff to invoke the product line exception against a successor that bought
the original manufacturer's assets in a bankruptcy sale).
119. See Maloney v. American Pharm. Co., 255 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
120. See Lundell v. Sidney Mach. Tool Co., 236 Cal. Rptr. 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
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7. Duty to Warn
A number of jurisdictions have imposed successor liability based
upon the duty to warn, i.e. the successor's failure to warn the
predecessor's customers of product defects discovered or defects
that should have been discovered by the successor. 2' However,
courts have also held that succession alone does not impose such
liability; rather there must be an established relationship between
the successor and the customers of the predecessor, such as the
assumption of service contracts, the successor's continued servicing
of the product, or the successor's knowledge of the product's
location.122
II. PUN=TIVE DAMAGES
The next part of this article deals with the history and purposes
of punitive damages, which is relevant to understanding why the
imposition of punitive damages on a successor corporation may,
depending on the circumstances, be improper.
A. History of Punitive Damages
Punitive damage awards permeate our civil courts.123 While in
recent years the proliferation of punitive damage awards in
products liability cases has markedly increased,124 punitive damages
are certainly not new. 25 Indeed, the concept of punitive damages is
firmly embedded in our tort system, having been recognized by
121. See, e.g., Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1980).
122. See LaFountain v. Webb Indus. Corp., 951 F2d 544 (3d Cir. 1991); Florom v. Elliott
Mfg, 867 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1989).
123. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS § 2, at 7-15 (5th
ed. 1984).
124. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("Recent years . . . have witnessed an explosion in the frequency and size of
punitive damages awards."); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J., and Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing. As recently as a decade ago, the largest
award of punitive damages affirmed by an appellate court in a products liability case was
$250,000. Since then, awards more than 30"times as high have been sustained on appeal."). In
response to the volume of punitive damage claims, particularly in mass tort litigation, some
courts have entered orders deferring such claims. The sheer volume of punitive damages
cases in mass tort litigation has resulted in some courts deferring the issue indefinitely. See,
e.g., Amended Case Management Order of Justice Helen E. Freedman dated Sept. 20, 1996, §
17 in the New York City Asbestos Litigation ("[Plunitive damages are deferred until such
time as the Court deems otherwise, upon notice and a hearing.").
125. See Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) (acknowledging the historical
propriety of punitive damages).
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English common law nearly 250 years ago.126 Thus, punitive
damages have been around for a very long time.1 2 Opposition to
such damages has been long running as well.1 28  While
compensatory damages are awarded to compensate and restore
plaintiffs to their prior condition, 129 punitive damages are "awarded
against a [manufacturer] to punish [it] for outrageous conduct and
to deter [it] and others like [it] from similar conduct in the
future."3 0
B. Purposes of Punitive Damages: Punishment and Deterrence
Quasi-criminal in nature, punitive damages are sanctions imposed
primarily to punish 3' past wrongful conduct and also to deter
similar conduct by the defendant or other parties. 32 There are a
handful of jurisdictions adding compensation'33 and other goals'3 to
126. See Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (KB. 1763) (stating that punitive
damages "are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a
punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of
the detestation of the jury to the action itself."). See also Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S.
at 274 (discussing punitive damages under English common law); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL,
supra note 123, at 7-15.
127. David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L
REv. 1257, 1263 (1976) (citing Huckle v. Money, 2 WIrs. 205, 207 (KB. 1763) and Wilkes v.
Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (KB. 1763)).
128. See Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872) ("The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous
heresy. It is an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the body
of law.").
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORms § 903 (1977).
130. Id. § 908(1). See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (noting
that punitive damages "are not compensation for injury but private fines levied by civil juries
to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence").
131. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19 (observing that most states impose punitive damages
"for purposes of retribution and deterrence"); Allen R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F3d 1326,
1332-33 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that punitive damages punish wrongdoers for their intentional
or malicious acts and are used to deter similar future conduct); Acosta v. Honda Motor Co.,
717 F2d 828, 836-37 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that punitive damages serve the twin goals of
punishment and deterrence).
132. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (describing punitive damages
as "quasi-criminal punishment"); Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 275 ("[Plunitive
damages advance the interests of punishment and deterrence, which are also among the
interests advanced by the criminal law . . ."); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (explaining that punitive damage awards are "quasi-criminal");
REsTATEMENT, supra note 129, § 908.
133. See Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 234 A.2d 825 (Conn. 1967); Joba Const. Co.,
Inc. v. Burns & Roe, Inc., 329 N.W2d 760 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Hofer v. Lavander, 679
S.W2d 479 (Tex. 1984).
134. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damage Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform,
39 ViLu L Rev. 363, 374 (1994) (articulating five functions of punitive damage awards: "(1)
education, (2) retribution, (3) deterrence, (4) compensation and (5) law enforcement").
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the purposes of punitive damages. Punitive damages are, thus, not
truly awards but actually constitute fines and penalties. 35 It has
also been recognized that an aggrieved party derives satisfaction
from seeing the defendant ordered to pay punitive damages and
that this discourages resort to revengeful actions.' 36 Such damages
also serve to publicly avenge a wrong from a moral perspective.
37
The predicate conduct for such damages is the egregious behavior
of the defendant ' 38 and, accordingly, punitive damages are not
assessed vicariously. 39 Rather, the punishment is intended for the
individual wrongdoer.'14
The other main objective cited to support the rationale of
punitive damages is the deterrence of similar wrongful conduct by
the defendant and others in the future.14 1 The financial pain of
paying an award of punitive damages strengthens the law's
admonition to refrain from such conduct."4
135. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19 (stating that punitive damages serve the identical
purpose as criminal punishment). See also RFSTATEMENT, supra note 129, § 908(1) cmt. a
(remarking that the purpose of punitive damages is same as purpose of criminal fines).
136. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HI-Iv. L REv. 517, 520-22
(1957).
137. See id.; JAMEs D. GHiARDI & JOHN J. KIcHE, PusrrIvE DAMAGEs: LAW & PRACTCE
§ 5.01 (1984). Interestingly, the late United States Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall
stated that punishment motivated by revenge has no place in a civilized society. See Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 343 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
138. GimRDi & KIRCHER, supra note 137. The level of conduct differs among the states.
See, e.g., CAL CIV. CODE § 3288 (Deering 1996) (requiring "oppression, fraud, or malice",
express or implied, for breach of noncontractual obligation); Ft,& STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(a)
(West Supp. 1990) (requiring "willful, wanton or gross misconduct").
139. GHiARDI & KmcHER, supra note 137 § 24.02. However, a corporate entity may be
vicariously liable for misconduct of employees based on an agency relationship. KEEmN gr
AL, supra note 123, at 7. Some jurisdictions have adopted the complicity rule requiring that
the employer ordered, participated or ratified the misconduct prior to the imposition of
punitive damages upon the employer for the misconduct. See Clarence Morris, Punitive
Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 Omo ST. LJ. 216, 221 (1960).
140. Rental & Management Associates, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 982 (N.Y.
Sup. 1992), aff'd 614 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1st Dep't. App. Div. 1994).
141. See, e.g., OWEN, supra note 134, at 1279; Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., v.
Garrett, 682 A.2d 1143, 1161 (Md. 1996) ("The purpose of punitive damages is not only to
punish the defendant for egregiously bad conduct toward the plaintiff, but also to deter the
defendant and others contemplating similar behavior.").
142. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L REv. 1173, 1184 (1931).
Furthermore, punitive damages are not insurable in most states. GHiARDI & KIRCHER, supra
note 137, § 7.13.
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C. Level of Misconduct Justifying A Punitive Award
The level of misconduct the defendant must have engaged in as a
prerequisite to warranting punitives varies' 43 but, in general, must
be in some respect outrageous.' 44 The conduct must involve "some
element of outrage similar to that usually found in crime.' 45
Ordinary negligence does not justify an award of punitives' 46 but,
rather, the conduct must be motivated by evil. 47  Thus, an
assessment of punitives is linked to a determination that the
defendant's conduct was outrageous. 14 In addition, some states
have enacted tort reform statutes that codify the specific conduct
warranting punitive damages. 49
D. Burden of Proof
The purpose of tort law is restitutionary and, therefore, the
preponderance of the evidence standard is used for assessing
compensatory damages.' 5°  In contrast, punitive damages are
quasi-criminal in nature.' 5' Accordingly, the level of proof is usually
more stringent; to wit, the "clear and convincing" evidence
standard.5 2 This standard calls for "that measure or degree of proof
that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be
143. Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 E2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1993) (applying Ohio law) (stating
that punitives would be imposed only if manufacturer flagrantly indifferent to probability
that conduct would cause substantial harm); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A_2d 633
(Md. 1992) (requiring actual malice to assess punitives); Herman v. Sunshine Chemical
Specialties, 608 A.2d 978 (N.J. Super. 1992) (requiring outrageous misconduct demonstrating
reckless disregard for others); Lugo, by Lopez v. LJN Toys, Ltd., 539 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925 (1st
Dep't. App. Div. 1989), affd 552 N.E.2d 162 (N.Y. 1990) (requiring evil motive or willful and
intentional conduct).
144. GmARDI & KIRcHER, supra note 137, § 5.01-.03. Otherwise, punitives could be
assessed in any case wherein the compensatory damages were considered insufficient to
deter future conduct.
145. RESTATEMENT, supra note 129, § 908 cmt b.
146. Id.
147. Rental & Management Assocs., Inc., 588 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
148. Id. at 983.
149. Alabama's statute allows punitive damages where the defendant engaged in
"oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice .... " AtA CODE § 6-11-20(a) (1993 & Supp. 1996).
Florida permits punitive damages for "willful, wanton or gross misconduct" FLA STAT. ANN. §
768.73(1)(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 1995). Illinois permits punitive damages when the
"defendant's conduct was with an evil motive or with reckless and outrageous indifference to
a highly unreasonable risk of harm and with a conscious indifference to the rights and safety
of others." 735 IL Comp. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.05(b) (West 1993).
150. GHIARDI & KiRCHE, supra note 143, § 9.12.
151. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 129, § 908 cmt. b.
152. GHIARDI & KiRCHER, supra note 143, § 9.12.
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established."15 Of course various jurisdictions have different
burdens. 1 4
III. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Many states have allowed the imposition of punitive damages
against successor corporations in products liability cases. 1' The
cases in which punitive damages were imposed upon successor
corporations have usually arisen in the context of asbestos
personal injury cases involving Celotex. 15 The combination of the
similarity in facts and the nationwide scope of these asbestos
decisions 157 has enabled commentators to cite to the Celotex
asbestos cases in discussing this issue.15 The relevant facts are as
follows. 159 Philip Carey Manufacturing Company ("Old Carey"), an
asbestos product manufacturer, began operations in 1888. In 1967,
Old Carey merged into Glen Alden, which immediately transferred
Old Carey into a wholly owned subsidiary, Philip Carey
Manufacturing Company ("New Carey"). In 1970, New Carey
merged into Briggs Manufacturing Company, renaming itself
Panacon Corporation. Panacon continued the asbestos business
through its Philip Carey division. In 1972, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Jim Walter Corporation, Celotex, acquired Panacon
from Glen Alden for cash and merged Panacon into Celotex.
Celotex continued to operate the asbestos division through a Philip
Carey division until 1973. Celotex distributed asbestos products
153. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 101(4) (1986); Camillo v. Geer, 587 N.Y.S.2d 306 (App.
Div. 1992); Vogt v. Emerson Electric qo., 805 F Supp. 506 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).
154. Compare Freeman v. Alamo Management Co., 607 A.2d 370 (Conn. 1992)
(preponderance of the evidence) with Camillo v. Geer, 587 N.Y.S.2d 306 (App. Div. 1992)
(clear and convincing evidence) and Vogt v. Emerson Electric Co., 805 F. Supp. 506 (M.D.
Tenn. 1992) (clear and convincing evidence).
155. See Richard D. Schuster, Comment, Punitive Damages Awards in Strict Liability
Litigation: The Doctrine, The Debate, The Defenses, 42 Omo ST. LJ. 771, 793 (1981).
156. Celotex litigated this issue in the 1980s. See In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F.
Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Celotex Corp. v. Pickett, 490 So. 2d 35 (Fla 1986); Brotherton v.
Celotex Corp., 493 A.2d 1337 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
157. Celotex raised the issue either through a motion in limine or a sumnmary judgment
motion. See In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 19&3); Celotex Corp. v.
Pickett, 490 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1986); Brotherton v. Celotex Corp., 493 A.2d 1337 (N.J. Super.
1985).
158. See, e.g., Deborah E. Bielicke, Note, Successor Liability for Punitive Damages:
Breaking The Corporate Rule, WASH. U. L Q., 339, 359 (1990); LEVENSTAM AND LYNCH, supra
note 1, at 30.
159. The facts are based on the many cases involving Celotex. See, e.g., In re Related
Asbestos Cases, 566 F Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d
1088 (Pa. 1985); Brotherton v. Celotex Corp., 493 A.2d 1337 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
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with warning labels but retained some of Panacon's employees.
Celotex was sued as a defendant in tens of thousands of asbestos
personal injury cases alleging exposure to the products of Philip
Carey.
A. The Formalistic Approach
In a statutory merger, one corporation is absorbed by another
and the latter becomes the successor.16° State statutes impose
successor liability on the surviving corporation.16' Generally, courts
have imposed compensatory liability upon corporate successors
under the theory that the surviving entity of a merger is responsible
for the debts and obligations of its predecessor since the merger
"merely directs the blood of the old corporation into the veins of
the new." 62 Automatic compensatory liability is a fundamental
principle of corporate law and compensatory liability is statutorily
imposed.1 Courts have adopted this principle to likewise impose
automatic punitive liability upon successor corporations, reasoning
that such liability follows the wrongdoer." 4
An application of the formalistic approach to successor liability
for punitive damages wherein the form of the transaction governs
is Celotex Corp. v. Pickett.'65 In Pickett, the court found that the
statutory merger served as the conduit for imposing both
compensatory and punitive damages upon the successor.166 The
Pickett court held that a successor may be responsible for
exemplary damages when it is the culmination of a statutory
merger. 67 Under the reasoning set forth in Pickett, the court found
no rationale for considering punitive damages in a manner different
from any other contingent liability. '8 The court further held that
finding the successor liable for punitive damages advanced the two
primary goals of punitive damages-punishment and deterrence.
69
The court observed that its decision punishes the "present [legal]
160. 15 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 7041.
161. Note that varying the terms of the transaction can avoid this fate A purchaser of
assets may use both cash and stock.
162. Moe v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 98 Cal. Rptr. 547, 556-57 (1971).
163. 15 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 7121.
164. 15 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 7123.10, n.6.
165. 490 So. 2d 35 (Fla 1986).
166. Pickett, 490 So. 2d at 38.
167. Id. Accord Duca v. Raymark Indus., No. 84-0587, slip op. at 4 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 7,
1986); KrulU v. Celotex Corp., 611 F Supp. 146, 148-49 (N.D. 111. 1985).
168. Pickett, 490 So. 2d at 37-38.
169. Id. at 38.
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embodiment" of the entity whose conduct gave rise to the
damage.
170
B. The Non-Formalistic Approach
An example of a case that looked beyond the form of the
transaction in determining the propriety of imposing punitive
damages on a successor is Brotherthon v. Celotex Corp.17' In
Brotherton, the court found a statutory merger to be merely one of
the prerequisites for holding a successor liable for punitive
damages.172 A second step must then be fulfilled, i.e. either the
continuity of enterprise or the product line exception must be
satisfied before punitive damages are imposed upon the
successor. 173
Most courts adopting the two-step approach 174 have rejected the
product line theory in favor of the continuity of enterprise
exception to evaluate the propriety of imposing punitive damages
on a successor. 175 According to Brotherton,
[t]he product line theory is designed to liberalize recovery for
plaintiffs left remediless against a defunct corporation. This
aim is consistent with the rationale behind compensatory
damages, which is to reimburse individuals for losses
sustained . . . . The continuation test fulfills a different
function. This test allows punitive damages to be assessed
against a successor where it shares certain similarities with its
predecessor. By creating an identity requirement, the
continuation test furthers the primary objectives of punitive
damages, i.e., punishment of the wrongdoer and deterrence of
similar conduct in the future. 176
While Brotherton recognized the de jure character of the Celotex
merger for purposes of compensatory liability, with respect to
punitive liability, the Brotherton court analyzed the issue beyond
170. Id.
171. 493 A.2d 1337 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
172. Brotherton, 493 A.2d at 1340.
173. Id. at 1342-43.
174. Many courts reject the two step approach and find punitive damages justified
based solely on a statutory merger. See, e.g., Celotex v. Pickett, 490 So. 2d 35, 38 (Fla. 1986);
Marks v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 232 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1986); Hanlon v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 599 F Supp. 376, 378 (N.D. Iowa 1984).
175. See, e.g., Brotherton., 493 A.2d at 1341; In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 E Supp.
818 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
176. See Brotherton, 493 A.2d at 1342.
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the form of the transaction, employing a "degree of identity" test.
In In re Related Asbestos Cases, the court did not accept the de
jure nature of the Celotex merger and characterized the transaction
as if Celotex had acquired its predecessor by a purchase of
assets.177 As the court characterized the transaction as an asset
purchase, only the product line exception as articulated in Ray v.
Akad would justify the imposition of punitive liability upon the
successor. As a result, in In re Related Asbestos Cases,178 the court
held that "the justifications underlying successor liability for
compensatory damages articulated in Ray v. Alad simply are not
present [w]hen punitive damages are sought."179 The court added
that imposing punitive damages upon the successor had the specter
of creating a windfall to the plaintiff,180 depriving future plaintiffs of
compensatory damages,18 1 and an inability to be covered financially
and face financial ruin.8 2
In Martin v. Johns-Manville,183 the court refused to impose
punitive damages based upon the form of the transaction but rather
looked at "the degree of identity" between the successor and the
predecessor.184 According to Martin, to impose punitives requires
evidence of an "identity of the successor with its predecessor so as
to justify the conclusion that those responsible for the reckless
conduct of the predecessor will be punished and the successor will
be deterred from similar conduct."185
In Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp.,186 the plaintiff sought
punitive damages against the successor. The court found that
punitive damages were unjustified because the successor had
eliminated the predecessor's management upon merger and
reconstituted the product. 87
A criticism can be leveled at the courts that have relied upon the
form of the transaction when one considers that punitive damages
infringe on the criminal law."" The vast majority of jurisdictions
177. 566 F Supp 818, 820 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
178. In re Related Asbsetos Cases, 566 F Supp. at 818. But see Certain Underwriters of
Lloyd's of London v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 786 F Supp. 867 (C.D. Cal. 1992).




183. 469 A.2d 655 (Pa. Super. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 494 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1985).
184. Martin, 469 A.2d at 667.
185. Id. at 1105. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not address this issue on appeal.
186. 591 F2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978).
187. Drayton, 591 E2d at 366.
188. See Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873) ("How could the idea of punishment be
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seek to punish and deter tortfeasors. Accordingly, the lynchpin of
punitive damages is the personal fault of the entity. An innocent
successor should not be forced to pay punitive damages, which
really amount to a fine.
Under proper circumstances, levying punitive damages against a
successor is justified. However, neither moral nor economic
grounds exist for assessing punitive damages against an innocent
successor. In effect, such damages punish a corporation vicariously
for something that it did not do and which could have been
avoided by resort to a different method of acquisition. When
punitive damages are imposed upon an innocent successor, the
punishment and deterrence goals of punitive damages are
misdirected because the successors shareholders are not the ones
guilty of failing to monitor the entity whose misconduct is the basis
of the punitive liability. If the perpetrators of the misconduct are
not punished, how are the goals of punitive liability advanced?
Punitive damages are meant to punish egregious conduct 89 and
take into account the societal cost of the injury not covered by
compensatory damages.' 9° Harming innocent entities does not
advance the goals of punitives.191 The two primary goals
underpinning the rationale for punitive liability are punishment and
deterrence of outrageous misconduct. Punishment is aimed at the
wrongdoer. Deterrence is aimed at the misconduct, to deter the
tortfeasor and others from engaging in similar misconduct. The
punitive aspect is eviscerated if the wrongdoer is not punished.
Similarly, with respect to deterrence, imposing punitive liability on
an innocent successor corporation does not deter the wrongdoer
from engaging in future like misconduct.
deliberately and designedly installed as a doctrine of civil remedies?"). But see Comment,
Punitive Damages Awards in Strict Products Liability Litigation: The Doctrine, The
Debate, The Defenses, 42 Oiuo ST. LJ. 771, 774-76 (1981) (noting punitive damages do not
result in loss of liberty).
189. Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive
Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL L REv. 133, 138 (1982).
190. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56
S. CAL L REV. 1, 6 (1982).
191. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (stating that punitive
damages "are not compensation for injury... [but] are private fines levied by civil juries to
punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence"); Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas
Co., 63 F3d 1326, 1333 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Punitive damages . .. are fundamentally collective;
their purpose is to protect society by punishing and deterring wrongdoing.").
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IV. WHY INNOCENT SUCCESSORS SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT To
PUNrrES
A. Collecting Punitive Damages from the Estate of a Tortfeasor
An interesting comparison can be made between an attempt to
collect punitive damages from innocent successors and attempting
the same against the estate of a wrongdoer.192 In the latter, the
survivability of suit is typically controlled by statute. Since the twin
principal aims of punitives are punishment and deterrence, if the
tortfeasor is deceased, most courts have held that the goals are not
advanced by allowing punitives to be collected from the estate of
the decedent. 193 In contrast, a few courts have held that the goals
of punitive damages are advanced as others may be deterred from
similar conduct. 94
It appears that only six jurisdictions allow punitive damages to
be recoverable against a deceased tortfeasor's estate: Montana,
9 5
West Virginia, 196  Texas, 97  Alabama, 98  New Hampshire'9 and
Pennsylvania.2°° In Perry v. Melton, 10 the court ruled that because,
under West Virginia law, compensation is part of the goal of
punitives, imposing the same on an estate is consistent with the
goal of punitives.2 2 The court also held that the imposition of
punitives would serve to deter others from similar wrongful
conduct.
203
In Hofer v. Lavender,2°4 the court also found that since
192. The cases that follow deal only with claims for punitive damages as opposed to
double or treble damages.
193. Sullivan v. Associated Billposters & Distributors, 6 E2d 1000 (2d Cir. 1925); GAC
Corp. v. Callahan, 681 E2d 1295 (11th Cir. 1982); Holm v. Timber Indus., v. Plywood Corp. of
America, 51 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1966); Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988); Stafford v.
Purified Down Products Corp., 801 F Supp. 130 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Gordon v. Nathan, 352
N.YS.2d 464 (App. Div. 1974); Tarbrake v. Sharp, 894 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Va. 1995).
194. Ellis v. Zuck, 546 E2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977); Munson v. Raudonis, 387 A.2d 1174
(N.H. 1978).
195. Tillet v. Lippert, 909 P.2d 1158 (Mont. 1996).
196. Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8 (W.Va 1982).
197. Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984).
198. Ellis v. Zuck, 546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977) (predicting Alabama law).
199. Munson v. Raudonis, 387 A-2d 1174 (N.H. 1978).
200. G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127 (Pa. 1998).
201. 299 S.E.2d 8 (W.Va- 1982).
202. Perry, 299 S.E.2d at 12 (citing Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W.Va
1981)).
203. Perry, 299 S.E.2d.at 12.
204. 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984)
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compensation was one of the aims of punitive damages, the same
could be recovered from an estate.2 5 The dissent noted that "the
punitive and deterrent aims of exemplary damages are not
separable . . . . When, through death, the tortfeasor is no longer
subject to legal punishment, the general deterrent effect likewise is
greatly diminished, if not completely frustrated."2°16
In Ellis v. Zuck,20 7 the Fifth Circuit predicted that Alabama law
would allow recovery of punitives from the estate of a deceased
tortfeasor.208 While an earlier state case had stated that such
damages were not recoverable, 2°9 the Fifth Circuit treated the
statement as dictum and rejected it.210 The court relied upon the
Alabama decision of Shirley v. Shirley"' which held that a
wrongful death action may be filed against a deceased tortfeasor's
estate.212 Because such a suit could only be brought for punitive
damages, Ellis found that Alabama law would permit the recovery
of punitives from an estate.
213
In Munson v. Raudonis,214 the court ruled that punitive damages
were recoverable from a decedent's estate because such damages
compensate the plaintiff as opposed to punishing the estate.
215
In G.J.D. v. Johnson,2 6 the court held that in the event a
tortfeasor should die after suit is commenced against him, punitives
are nevertheless recoverable against his estate. The court found
that by imposing punitives upon a tortfeasor's estate, other
members of society would be deterred from engaging in tortious
conduct, thus advancing one of the goals of punitive damages.
217
The court further noted that safeguards were available, including
informing the jury that the award was sought against the
tortfeasor's estate and the availability of remittitur.21 8
The overwhelming number of jurisdictions to consider this issue
205. Hofer, 679 S.W2d at 475 (overruling Wright's Adm'x. v. Donnell, 34 Tex. 291 (1871)
(prohibiting recovery of punitive damages from an estate)).
206. Hofer, 679 S.W.2d at 478.
207. 546 F2d 643 (5th Cir. 1977).
208. Ellis, 546 E2d at 644.
209. Meigham v. Birmingham Terminal Co., 51 So. 775, 777-78 (Ala 1910).
210. EUis, 546 F.2d at 644.
211. 73 So. 2d 77 (Ala 1954)
212. Shirley, 73 So. 2d at 80.
213. Ellis, 546 F.2d at 644.
214. 387 A.2d 1174 (N.H.1978).
215. Munson, 387 A.2d at 1177-78.
216. 713 A.2d 1127 (Pa. 1998).
217. Johnson, 713 A.2d at 1131.
218. Id.
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prohibit the imposition of punitives against a tortfeasor's estate.
Jurisdictions espousing this viewpoint are Alaska
219 Arizona 220
California,221 Colorado,222 Florida,223 Georgia,224 Idaho,225 Iowa,226
linois, 227  Kansas,228  Louisiana,229  Maine,230  Massachusetts, 231
Minnesota,232 Mississippi, 23 Missouri,
2 4 Nevada,23 New Mexico, 2a6
New York, 237 North Carolina,2 Oklahoma,239 Oregon,24° Rhode
Island,24' Tennessee, 242  Vermont,2" Virginia,2" Wisconsin 245  and
Wyoming.
246
Those jurisdictions that preclude imposing punitive damages
upon the estate of a deceased tortfeasor do so because the
deceased cannot be punished or deterred. These jurisdictions reject
the notion that while the deceased is no longer subject to
punishment or deterrence, others may nevertheless be deterred
from engaging in like conduct. "The deterrent effect of punitive
damages on others... is inextricably tied to the punishment of the
tortfeasor. If the tortfeasor cannot be punished, it follows that
219. See Doe v. Colligan, 753 P.2d 144, 146 (Alaska 1988).
220. See Braun v. Moreno, 466 P.2d 60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970).
221. See CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 377.42 (West Supp. 1999) (prohibiting punitive damages
against decedent's representative or successor).
222. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-101 (1999).
223. See Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1988).
224. See Morris v. Duncan, 54 S.E. 1045, 1046 (Ga. 1906).
225. See IDAHO CODE § 5-327 (1988).
226. See Rowen v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979).
227. See Stafford v. Purofied Down Prods. Corp., 801 F. Supp. 130 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
228. See Fehrenbacher v. Quackenbush, 759 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Kan. 1991) (predicting
Kansas law).
229. See Johnson v. Levy, 47 So. 422 (La. 1908).
230. See Prescott v. Knowles, 62 Me. 277 (Me. 1874).
231. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 230, § 2 (West 1985).
232. See Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982).
233. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 91-7-235 (1999).
234. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hill, 245 F. Supp. 796 (W.D.Mo. 1965) (predicting
Missouri law).
235. See Allen v. Anderson, 562 P2d 487 (Nev. 1977).
236. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Maidment, 761 P.2d 446 (N.M. 1988).
237. See N.Y. EsT. PowERs & TRUSTS LAw § 11-3.2(1) (McKinney 1981).
238. See McAdams v. Blue, 164 S.E.2d 490 (N.C. Ct. App. 1968).
239. See Morriss v. Barton, 190 P.2d 451 (Okla. 1947).
240. See Pearson v. Galvin, 454 P.2d 638 (Ore. 1969).
241. See RI GEN. LAws § 9-1-8 (1997).
242. See Hayes v. Gill, 390 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. 1965).
243. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1454 (1989).
244. See Dalton v. Johnson, 129 S.E.2d 647 (Va. 1963).
245. See Wis. STAT. ANN. 895.02 (West 1997).
246. See Mercante v. Hein, 67 P.2d 196 (Wyo. 1937).
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there can be no general deterrence."247 In addition, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts also opines that punitive damages are not
recoverable against a tortfeasor's estate.214
The policy goals of most jurisdictions are such that punitive
damages are imposed to punish and deter.249 With respect to
innocent successors, the argument that punitive damages can serve
as a general deterrent is shaky at best. Deterrence through
punishment of the actual tortfeasor is logical. Punishment of a
blameless entity is wrong. A majority of jurisdictions have found
that the estate of a deceased tortfeasor cannot be punished or
deterred by the imposition of punitive damages.
This makes sense. As one court stated, "[w]ith the wrongdoer
dead, there is no one to punish, and to punish the innocent ignores
our basic philosophy of justice."25° In Martin v. Johns-ManviUe,251
the defendant argued that it should not be liable for punitive
damages based upon the conduct of its predecessor. While the
court upheld a punitive award, it did so because the successor was
not much changed from its predecessor.25 2 The court noted that if
the successor had different shareholders, officers and management
than its predecessor, the successor would not have been subject to
punitive damages.253 The court stated "it would make little if any
sense to impose punitive damages on the successor, for the actors
responsible for the predecessor's reckless conduct . . . would
neither be punished nor deterred from similar conduct by such an
award."
254
Case law has demonstrated a willingness to impose punitive
damages on a successor in the limited instance when the successor
is the result of a statutory merger,25 based on the idea that a
247. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Maidment, 761 P.2d 446, 449 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
See also Doe v. Colligan, 753 P2d 144, 146 (Alaska 1988) ("Since the deceased tortfeasor
cannot be punished, the general deterrent effect becomes speculative at best .... ").
248. "Punitive damages are not awarded against the representatives of a deceased
tortfeasor ...." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORm § 908, cmt. a (1979).
249. There are jurisdictions in which compensation is an additional goal. See Jackovich
v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 326 N.W. 2d 458 (Mich. App. Ct. 1982); Hofer v. Lavender,
679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1984); Waterbury Petroleum Prods., Inc. v. Canaan Oil & Fuel Co., Inc.,
477 A.2d 988 (Conn. 1984).
250. Lohr v. Byrd, 522 So.2d 845, 847 (Fla. 1988).
251. 469 A.2d 655 (Pa. Super. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 494 A-2d 1088 (Pa. 1985).
252. Martin, 469 A.2d at 667.
253. Id. at 666.
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Johns-Manville, 599 E Supp. 376 (N.D. Iowa 1984); Davis v.
Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557 (W.Va 1992).
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successor expressly undertakes liability for all liability of its
predecessor. However, under Brotherton, the successor must have
a real connection to the culpable conduct of its predecessor in
order for punitives to be assessed.
2 56
B. Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages
Vicarious liability for punitive damages - quasi criminal
punishment - is unfair.2 57 Unlike compensatory damages, punitive
damages focus on the culpability of the defendant. Under the
complicity rule, punitive liability is warranted against an employer
only when the owner or high management orders, participates in,
or ratifies the misconduct of its employee or agent.25s Under this
rule, without complicity, punitive damages are prohibited.259  Even
in jurisdictions with the complicity rule the employer will remain
liable for compensatory damages. This is a good analogy to the
successor corporation who is innocent of misconduct. A successor
ought not to be subject to punitive liability without some sort of
"complicity" in the wrongdoing, e.g. retention of employees of the
predecessor who engaged in the misconduct. Such complicity
would, in effect, evince a ratification of the egregious behavior and,
thus, warrant punitive liability.
Similarly, with respect to successors, only if a successor
"ratified" the predecessor's conduct should punitive damages be
imposed. If the successor continued the harmful conduct, acted in
furtherance of the conduct, or had key personnel of the
predecessor join the successor, one may find a complicity or
ratification of the predecessor's conduct justifying an award of
punitive damages against the successor. Absent such complicity, an
256. Brotherton, 493 A.2d at 1341-42. But see supra note 36.
257. See Francis, Criminal Responsibility of the Corporation, 18 ILL L REV. 305,
316-17 (1930) ("'Guilt is personal .... So, where an agent... commits a crime, as difficult
as is the question of authorization or inducement, we do not saddle the crime on the
principal unless we can in some way prove him a party to the crime.").
258. See, e.g., Lake Shore & M.S.R.R. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107 (1892).
259. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 states:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other principal
because of an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of the
act, or
(b) the, agent was unfit and the principal or managerial agent was reckless in
employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of
employment, or
(d) the principal or managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act.
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innocent successor ought not to be saddled with punitive liability
for the conduct of its predecessor.
CONCLUSION
In jurisdictions where the only goals of punitive damages are
punishment and deterrence, allowing punitive damages to be levied
against an innocent successor is wrong because neither goal is
served. Quasi-criminal in nature, punitives ought not to be assessed
against blameless parties. Imposing punitive damages on a
successor innocent of wrongdoing is, thus, inconsistent with the
goals of punitive damages. When the successor has liability for
compensatory damages, different objectives are in play. Moreover,
failure to punish an innocent successor through the imposition of
punitive damages will not allow the guilty entity to escape
punishment. Bad faith transfers, fraudulent conveyances and de
facto mergers remain viable conduits to impose punitive damages
upon a successor corporation should the actual wrongdoers
attempt to employ "corporate machinations" to escape punitive
liability.260
The product line theory likewise does not justify the imposition
of punitive damages upon innocent successors. Three of the four
justifications are not part of the punitive context.261 The fourth, the
cost bearing, is not a legitimate basis because compensatory
damages are separate from and not a part of punitive damages.
While the Brotherton continuity of enterprise exception provides a
better justification, it too does not truly provide a viable basis for
punitive liability. In a continuity of enterprise situation, the
successor does not deprive the plaintiff of a remedy, as
compensatory damages are available. In addition, punitive liability
is arguably not taken into account by the continuity of enterprise
exception. Finally, the test does not take into account fault, the
very touchstone of punitive liability.
Mergers present adequate policy reasons for imposing
compensatory damages. However, mergers alone are insufficient to
impose punitive liability. There must additionally be proof of fault,
such as a perpetuation of the misconduct or knowledge of the
260. Each of these doctrines requires the involvement of the predecessor's wrongdoers
in the successor and, thus, those guilty of the misconduct will be punished and the goals of
punitive liability advanced.
261. The successor did not place the product in commerce, did not warrant it and,
unless notice was provided to it, did not have the ability to cure the defect.
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defect without placing a warning on the product, in order for there
to exist adequate grounds for imposing punitive damages upon a
successor. In contrast, if a successor eliminates the product and/or
management of its predecessor, the mere fact that a merger
occurred should be insufficient justification to impose punitive
liability on a successor. Rather, the focus should be on the fault of
the successor. This will comport with both corporate law's goal of
certainty and the goals of punitive damages.
A rule whereby only the entity guilty of the misconduct is
saddled with punitives is fair. Such a rule would not allow
tortfeasors to escape from punitive damages because the focus in
the consideration of whether punitives are appropriate is on
conduct. The successors to fraudulent mergers and de facto
mergers, as well as "new hat" successors, would remain subject to
punitive damages because the participants in the wrongful conduct
of the predecessor continue in the new ventures. Furthermore, the
focus in a punitive damage determination ought to be on a
successor's conduct as opposed to the form of the transaction.
Some courts have recognized the importance of conduct and have
moved away from the rigid imposition of punitives based solely on
the transaction.2 2 Rather than the form of the transaction
controlling, courts should evaluate the conduct of the successor
corporation and the circumstances surrounding the transaction to
determine whether levying punitive damages on the successor
corporation furthers the twin purposes of punitive damages, i.e.,
punishes an entity that has engaged in wrongdoing and deters
others from engaging in like misconduct.
262. Compare In re Related Asbestos Cases, 566 F Supp. 818, 824 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(finding that liability for punitive damages would be inappropriate because the successor did
not engage in tortious conduct) with Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 469 A.2d 655, 667 (Pa
Super. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 494 A.2d 1088 (Pa. 1985). (stating that simply because
the successor did'not continue manufacturing the product, it is not exonerated from punitive
damages liability).
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